The Versailles Treaty (Art. 227) called for the prosecution of Wilhelm II, the German ex-Kaiser.
It was nearly a hundred years ago that the First World War (a.k.a. the Great War) started. Its causes and the responsibility for its outbreak are still under serious debate. However, at the end of the war the Allied and Associated Powers made one thing very clear: in their eyes the main culprit was the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, and he should be prosecuted for what he had done. Art. 227 of the Versailles Treaty could not be misunderstood:
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed. The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.
A request to the Dutch government for Wilhelms' surrender had been made necessary by his flight; on 10 November 1918 the -soon former 1 -Kaiser had crossed the Dutch borders. It seems that the French prime minister, Clemenceau, acting on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers (hereafter Allied Powers), shortly after conclusion of the Treaty, on 28 June 1919, for the first time requested the extradition of the Kaiser -a request that, however, was politely refused. 2 Of
1.
His abdication was published 9 Nov. 1918 in the Reichs-Anzeiger, only signed by the Reichskanzler; it was followed by a more formal abdication on 28 Nov. 1918, published 30 Nov. 1918 in the Reichs-Anzeiger.
2.
A second request (also signed by Clemenceau) followed on 15 Jan. 1920 and was refused on 21 Jan. 1920, and a last request (signed by Lloyd George) was made on 14 Feb. course, the Allied Powers could have tried Wilhelm in absentia, but obviously they did not want to do so; although it has never been clarified whether they even discussed this option, it may be assumed that it was highly repulsive to American and British legal minds. 3 But what would have happened when the Kaiser had been surrendered? For the Allied Powers there would have been no way back; without any doubt the Kaiser was put on trial. But would there have been crimes for which he could be convicted? And if so, what might have been the sanction? We do not think that an attempt to answer these questions will amount to pure speculation; 4 but it will be no easy task, either. Answering such questions requires some knowledge of the history of the Versailles treaty, but above all it will lead us to the opinions of the academic community in the field of international (criminal) law in those times, buried in many books. Has such an exercise any use? We think it does; it reveals the 'prehistory' of international (criminal) law. We will meet many problems that are still actual today; studying them in the context of the Great War could help us to understand them. But the most intriguing question of all is: would the trial of the Kaiser have accelerated the development of the law in this field, and if so, on which points? Of course, it will not be possible to provide answers in a simple essay like this; but we will try to give an outline of what could be expected from such research. It was charged to inquire into and report upon the following points: 1. the responsibility of the authors of the war; 2. the facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war; 3. the degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs and other individuals, however highly placed; 4. the constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences; 5. any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the enquiry, and which the Commission finds useful and relevant to take into consideration.
Hanging the Kaiser
In its report 7 of 29 March 1919, the Central Powers were brandmarked for authoring the war, for violating the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, guaranteed by treaty, and for carrying on the war by illegitimate methods in violation of the established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity. However, the Commission found that it would not make much Here the Kaiser had been included because 'the trial of the offenders might be seriously prejudiced if they attempted and were able to plead the superior orders of a sovereign against whom no steps had been or were being taken.' 11 The politicians 12 however kept to their opinion that the former Kaiser should (also) be tried for his responsibility as author of the war. They shared 'a growing feeling that war itself was a crime against humanity'; 13 thus bringing the case against the Kaiser into court also stood for 'a new world order'. 14 Obviously they expected that his prosecution would be followed by a conviction. Especially the French did not doubt such an outcome. 15 As to the question whether waging an aggressive war was a criminal act, they were in good company: the American members of the Commission, disagreeing with the majority, believed that any nation going to war assumes a grave responsibility, and that a nation engaging in a war of aggression commits a crime. They hold that the neutrality of nations should be observed, especially when it is guaranteed by a treaty to which the nations violating it are parties, and that the plighted word and the good faith of nations should be faithfully observed in this as in all other respects. 16 The only reason why the Americans did not formally dissent from the conclusions of the Commission on the ius ad bellum was 'the difficulty of determining whether an act is in reality one of aggression or of defence'. As an afterthought, they added that a head of state only is responsible to the law of his own country, unless he has abdicated or has been repudiated by his people (by then both applied to the Kaiser). What to do with defeated heads of state was a question for statesmen, not for judges to decide; their offences were of a political nature and should therefore be met by political sanctions 17 (obviously they had in mind the option of sending the Kaiser to a place like the Falkland Islands, as Napoleon had been sent to Saint Helena). In England, Lord Birkenhead said: the ex-Kaiser ought to be punished, either by way of trial or as Napoleon was punished. (Some people incline) to the first of those courses, namely that he should be tried. I am not at present wholly convinced upon this point (but) I say quite plainly that I should feel the greatest difficulty in being responsible in any way for the trial of subordinate criminals if the exKaiser is allowed to escape. 18 In any case, a judgment by politicians was what the politicians, after some debate, decided not to give. They found that the Kaiser should be prosecuted for his breaches of the ius ad bellum, to wit supreme offences against international morality and the sanctity of treaties, before an independent international court, and that he would have a fair trial. Even after a four-year war and millions of deaths, such a court -in their opinioncould be found, and fairness of the procedure could be 14. Willis, above n. 2, at 3-4. 15. Obviously they leaned heavily on De Lapradelle/Larnaude, who solved many problems by declaring: 'Un droit international nouveau est né' (above n. 6 at 144). Exemplary for the French post-war literature on the subject is their sneer on the ex-Kaiser, 'déserteur de sa propre armée' at 137. In the same style A. The German Government recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her allies. The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the German authorities. 21 Retribution was the main object of these clauses; the Allied powers already had brought captive German officers 22 to justice who had breached the laws and customs of war, but they wanted also to try culprits who were not (yet) in their power. Emphasising the validity of the pre-war ius in bello, as it had been written in the Hague Conventions and as it would be found in customary law, could be seen as a second motive. The Commission on Responsibility found that the war had been carried on 'by barbarous or illegitimate methods in violation of the established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity'. 23 leaves no doubt that, in the opinion of its majority, the Kaiser should not be prosecuted for breaches of the ius ad bellum, but for the German infringements upon the ius in bello. Only the American and the Japanese members disagreed even on this point, mainly because they did not want to prosecute for offences that had not been directly ordered by the Kaiser. They strongly disliked what they called the doctrine of negative criminality, based on criminal liability for mere abstention from preventing violations of the laws and customs of war and of humanity. There is no reason why the politicians would not have followed the Commission on this point. That the Kaiser is only mentioned in Art. 227 of the Treaty, and not in Art. 228, may not be used as an argument why it would not be acceptable to prosecute him also under Art. 228; but did the politicians also adopt negative responsibility? The Commission on Responsibility recommended to base a prosecution for violations of the laws and customs of war on 'the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience'. 24 Unmistakably these criteria have been inspired by the so-called Martens clause in the pre-amble of the second 1899 Hague treaty, repeated in the pre-amble of the fourth 1907 Hague treaty:
En attendant qu'un Code plus complet des lois de la guerre puisse être édicté, les Hautes Parties contractantes jugent opportun de constater que, dans les cas non compris dans les dispositions réglementaires adoptées par Elles, les populations et les belligérants restent sous la sauvegarde et sous l'empire des principes du droit des gens, tels qu'ils résultent des usages établis entre les nations civilisées, des lois de l'humanité et des exigences de la conscience publique.
It was probably to appease the Americans that the laws of humanity in the end did not appear in the Versailles treaty; they thought that 'the laws of humanity do not constitute a definite code with fixed penalties which can be applied through judicial process'. 25 This means that the indictment against Wilhelm II could have been the following: (see Table on next page). Before we ask ourselves what a court would have decided, another question has to be answered: was a trial not superfluous? Had the new German Republic not accepted its war guilt? Art. 231 of the Versailles treaty reads:
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.
Allied politicians eagerly used this text to assure their adherents that the time to discuss German guilt had passed: they had the German confession black on white. This, however, is utter nonsense. Of course, an extorted confession is worthless, even when extorted by treaty, and never could the Republic confess on behalf of the Kaiser; but neither did they confess on behalf of the former Reich. It is not without importance that Art. 231 is not a part of chapter 7 of the treaty, on penalties, but of chapter 8, on reparations. There the Republic promised to pay the bill for the war and conceded they had started the actual fighting (which was quite clear) and could therefore be called 'aggressors'; but guilt -criminal or only moral guilt -is quite something else. All that may be deducted from Art. 231 is civil responsibility. 26
Criminal Liability
What was the discussion, whether the Kaiser could be prosecuted for waging war, really about? We already distinguished the ius in bello from the ius ad bellum. An important part of the ius in bello had been defined in the 1907 Hague treaties; insofar there were clear and mostly unambiguous norms -but could infringements upon these norms be punished criminally? And probably there was still an unwritten part of the ius in bello left, on the customs of the war on sea, for example. The ius ad bellum, to the contrary, never had been defined; some authors even doubted its existence (they thought that the decision to start a war was not governed by law), but if it existed, it was dubious whether infringements could be punished. The 'special tribunal' as foreseen in Art. 227 of the treaty would have to break its own way, leaning on the existing literature. Inspecting this literature, the tribunal would find that, although the famous Emerich de Vattel, probably the most studied and the In former times, anyone who went down in battle and could not save himself by flight had to surrender unconditionally. The victorious party could freely dispose of its captive enemies. Usually there was no hesitation to incarcerate, banish, or even execute the former opponents without any form of procedure when it was thought that this would serve the victors interests; even more so, when the captives were accused of evil deeds. Thus Napoleon I was banished to Elba and later imprisoned on Saint Helena. From this, a rule of customary law could be derived, saying that whoever misbehaved in war and succumbed to his opponent could be sanctioned by him. In that case, it would be a step forward not simply to imprison the Kaiser for life on the Falkland Islands but to try him before an independent court under strict rules of procedure, guaranteeing his rights to defend himself effectively. 31 In this line of reasoning, it becomes clear why under such circumstances the nullum crimen rule does not apply -in any case not in the strict sense in which it is used by criminal lawyers. Of course, there has to be a A clear norm of behaviour; nobody should be punished for his activities when he could not know that they were not allowed. But why would it not be sufficient that he is aware of the consequences which his acts could have if he would be caught? In fact, he benefits by granting him a criminal trial instead of a lynching. But what about the punishment? Again it seems sufficient when it lies within the range of possibilities that could be foreseen: a fine, imprisonment for some time or for life, or execution. This underlines that here international law has to define the limits of liability, not (classic) criminal law. It is axiomatic that prosecutions under international law are not subjected to legality in the strict sense of a requirement of well-defined prohibitions. Foreseeability is sufficient.
Criminal law, in such cases, only has to provide a procedure. As soon as international customary law has developed into clear, well-defined rules, supplemented by formal criminal liability and provided with well-defined penalties, it has lost its own peculiar character and has moved into the sphere of criminal law -in the same manner as (the law on) extradition has moved from international to criminal law. This prospect could also help to accept prosecutions under international law: they contribute to finding a more clear definition of the behaviour to be punished and thus open the door to formal criminal law, with its more strict application of the nullum crimen rule. 32 This construction of trial and punishment under international law has been recognised in 1954, in Art. 7(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights:
This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law, recognised by civilised nations. 33 Here we have to do with the most serious category of criminal behaviour that can be imagined; whoever acts in this way knows that, if he is caught, he can expect a severe -maybe even the most severe -punishment. It would be highly unpractical, for that reason unacceptable and moreover dogmatically erroneous, to require that prospective war criminals should beforehand be able to calculate more exactly the punishment they could expect. It would be useless too; maybe people can be kept from committing war crimes by the knowledge that they will be caught and prosecuted, but they surely will not be kept back by knowledge of the sanction they can expect. In this field, sanctions will not have a preventive effect; they are purely retributive.
As we already explained, as soon as international criminal law, as part of international law, has developed into common criminal law, one may expect more, especially clear-cut rules which punishments may be given, and in what measure, and also what kinds of aggravating or alleviating circumstances could be accepted. 34 In short, the nullum crimen, nulla poena rule does apply in international law but only insofar that suspects should be able to foresee for what kind of activities they will be punished, if caught, and what their punishment could be; so it has a far less specific content and will be satisfied much easier than in criminal law. 35 This approach could -and in our opinion, probably wouldhave been used in criminal proceedings against Wilhelm II. wished to prosecute them when they were still in power. 40 There was some relation with the exception of superior orders (to be discussed hereafter): when one did accept such an exception, it would be unacceptable that the source of these orders would enjoy immunity. 45 Huber, 46 and Von Ullmann, 47 deny the state a right to go to war if it saw fit to do so. Some of them, like Kohler, thought that war is something 'jenseits von Recht und Unrecht'; 48 Nys and Hall defended the thesis that war is not a subject of international law at all and therefore cannot be prohibited. In any case, a denial of a ius ad bellum is not to be found in the pre-war literature, neither in treaty law. 49 Art. 1 of the second 1907 Hague convention (Convention concernant la limitation de l'emploi de la force pour le recouvrement de dettes contractuelles, or Drago-Porter Convention) stipulated:
Les Puissances Contractantes sont convenues de ne pas avoir recours à la force armée pour le recouvrement de dettes contractuelles réclamées au Gouvernement d'un pays par le Gouvernement d'un autre pays comme dues à ses nationaux. This is unmistakably formulated as an exception to a general rule. We conclude that the Special Tribunal under Art. 227 could not have found that waging war was a criminal act. In that case, Wilhelm had to be acquitted from count 1 of the indictment. Had the Court decided otherwise, it would have written new law 50 and would have been about 70 years ahead of its time. However, between 1914 and 1920 several highly respectable authors did defend that waging war was a criminal act but always when looking for a way to punish Wilhelm! They used simplifications like:
Alors que l'infraction à la paix publique d'un Etat entraîne les peines les plus graves, on ne comprendrait pas qu'une atteinte à la paix du monde demeurât sans sanction. 51 Here we see the risks of criminal trials under international law in optima forma: without a strict nullum crimen rule, it would be difficult not to give in to public opinion by creating new law and applying it retrospectively. But what about infringement of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg? 52 The neutrality of Belgium had been guaranteed by the German Reich -was the German Reich free to see this guarantee as no more than a scrap of paper? Or, from a somewhat different point of view: could a qualified kind of waging war be defined as a crime: attacking another country, only because this would be useful in conducting war against a third party? And would this breach of the law be even more qualified by an explicit guarantee of neutrality? Some authors thought that even in such a case it could only be for the state itself to decide whether it should honour its word; but much support for this point of view cannot be found. The international respect for and value of treaties as instruments for the arrangement of mutual relations as well as the act of violating an explicit guarantee would -in our view -be enough to conclude that Wilhelm at least could foresee the wrongfulness of this action under the 'nullum crimen' rule as developed above. For that reason, we think it probable that Wilhelm would have been convicted for committing a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties by not respecting the neutrality of, at least, Belgium. That also would have been something new but not quite as revolutionary as criminalising the waging of war in general.
Command Responsibility
Counts 3, 4, and 5 of our indictment elicit another question: in how far would the Kaiser have been responsible for acts, not of his own, but of others under his command? This even today is a hotly debated issue: should we accept command responsibility, and, if so, how far does it reach? When there is no individual 'Schiess-Befehl', or at least the existence of no individual order can be proved, 53 criminal liability can only be based on more indirect actions -or lack of actions. We enumerate some possibilities: -variant 1: gross negligence in preventing infringements upon the laws of war more generally, e. seas? Great Britain had been successful in preventing any treaty law on this subject; could nevertheless a sufficient clear and generally accepted corpus of customary law on this subject be defined? Looking back in all objectivity it is highly doubtful whether on the basis of international law an affirmative answer could have been given. If not, the Court was sure to be severely criticised; but from the other side it probably could not convict Wilhelm on this point without creating new law. And what about special aspects, like the intentional destruction of neutral ships and the order to the German submarines not to rescue enemy crews, because this would endanger themselves in a too high degree?
Sanctions
The Versailles Treaty left it to the Court 'to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed' ('Il lui appartiendra de determiner la peine qu'il estimera devoir être appliquée'). This covers all sanctions from a simple fine to imprisonment for life and even death; but the tribunal not only had to determine what sanction(s) could be imposed but also to fix their terms, for instance in case it would decide that (temporary) imprisonment 'should be imposed'. It is clear that in this respect Art. 227 differed from Art. 228. As Art. 227 dealt with new and, up to those years, unknown crimes, an international tribunal had to be introduced, and there was no sanction prescribed in any national or in international law. Art. 228, on the contrary, dealing with violations of the laws and customs of war, refers to a much clearer defined part of the law, but relies also on existing military tribunals that could apply existing national law; therefore, in Art. 228, the Treaty could also refer to punishments 'laid down by law'. It is to be noted that in those days military law in nearly all countries relied rather heavily on the death penalty. Art. 227 might be criticised for violation of legality, especially of the nullum poena sine lege principle. However, this principle has not the same theoretical 'weight' concerning the sanction as it has concerning criminal liability as such. Under Art. 27 of the Charter for the Nuremburg Tribunal, but even under Art. 77 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, there is a certain open decision for the tribunal to fix the penalty, although in the ICC Statute some boundaries have been fixed. The criticism from the Japanese and American members of the Commission on Responsibility on Art. 227, derived from this nullen crimen sine lege principle, was indeed directed to the definition of the (proposed) 'crimes', not to the determination of sanctions. Nevertheless, that Art. 227 Treaty did not even indicate what kind of sanction might be fixed by the tribunal is, in the views of today, a rather weak point. 58 Are there any more specific indications about the sanction(s) that might have been at stake? The Allied Powers wanted to assure Wilhelm a fair trial, as part of their attempt to put him to trial in a judicial (criminal) process for allegations on -more or less -moral grounds. One can argue that the guarantee that the sanction will not be (too) disproportionate in relation to the facts and crimes to which an accused has been found guilty may come within the scope of fair trial where the 'guarantees essential to the right of the defence', underlined in Art. 227 of the Treaty, are also related to the fact finding and discussion about these facts during trial, related to the determination of the appropriate sanction, the extent of punishment, the terms of imprisonment, etc. 59 Could deportation of Wilhelm to -for instance -the Falkland Islands have been an appropriate sanction and a sanction that he might have expected? This will hardly be the case. Except in France in those days deportation was not a criminal punishment under any national criminal law anymore. Moreover the deportation of Napoleon was mainly a safety measure because this French ex-emperor was still considered a danger for the international order and peace. Given the situation in Germany and Wilhelm exile in the Netherlands, it is understandable that this was not an argument that was in anyway taken into consideration. 60 We hear from Lloyd George that especially Clemenceau was not very interested in punishments; his main wish being that Wilhelm would be brandmarked and ostracised as a 'universal outlaw'. 61 Garner came to the same result by simple legal reasoning; he took the view that Wilhelm, if he was not prosecuted and convicted for a crime under the Penal Code, could not be sentenced, as (in his view) required by Art. 228 of the Versailles Treaty, to 'punishments laid down by law', 'and since the law of nations prescribes no penalties for offences against international morality or the sanctity of treaties' the Court would have but one option, to wit 'a formal pronouncement, stigmatizing (Wilhelm) as a treaty breaker (...) and holding him up to the execration of mankind.' 62 But Garner was wrong. The Commission on Responsibility asked for 'such punishment or punishments as may be imposed for such an offence or offences by any court in any country represented on the tribunal or in the country of the convicted person' 63 -and there is no reason to suppose that the treatymakers took another position, although they also wanted to try Wilhelm for supreme offences against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. Had the tribunal, in case of conviction, to apply any sanction, or would a conviction without a sanction be an option too? Do the words 'fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed' leave this possibility? One might argue that the Allied Powers were primarily interested in making clear that waging war and breaching a guaranteed neutrality were criminal under international law and would have accepted 'a formal condemnation', as it had been proposed by the Commission on Responsibility. But would this, in those years, really have been a realistic option? Anyway the combination of Artt. 227 and 228 gave the Court as much liberty as later the Nuremburg Court 64 and the Yugoslavia Tribunal would have. It really is a pity we do not know how it would have used this liberty.
Conclusion
We repeat: the above gives not more than a first very global outline of what could have happened when Wilhelm really had been prosecuted. In any case, it seems clear that, unless the (rather improbable) possibility of a complete acquittal, the Court would have created an important piece of international criminal law and would have levelled the path for the Nuremburg Court. Could it also have made history take a different turn? We do not think so. The power of the courts, and of law in general, is limited; probably the deterrent effect of convictions in the field of crimes against humanity is not much more than zero. But perhaps the tribunal would have boosted up morality, and in any case it would have considerably accelerated developments in criminal law. A last word. The Second World War was a war against evil that had overcome Germany; but the Great War was carried on against the German people itself. Although Pangerman thinking 65 had a strong influence on German politics in the decade before 1914, not many of its adherents were in power during the Great War and for that simple reason would not have been prosecuted. Perverted nationalistic ideas like those propagated by Kohler, and those uttered sometimes by Wilhelm himself, really started prospering in the times of Hindenburg and Hitler; the turn of their protagonists to stand trial still had to come after 1945. One has to keep in mind that the type of defendants in Nuremburg was quite different from the persons the Allied Powers intended to prosecute after 1918. It is highly improbable that this would not have influenced the outcome.
64. The Charter of this Tribunal (Art. 27) mentioned the death penalty or any other punishment that the Tribunal would think fit. See the comment by Quaritsch, above n. 27, at 162: 'Das Kriegsvölkerrecht enthält jedoch keine 'poena', nämlich keinen Strafrahmen, der Richter ist in diesen Fällen auf die Strafdrohungen des nationalen Rechts angewiesen. Man kann nicht annehmen, das (Gericht) könne die Strafe zwischen Geldbusse und Tot durch Erhängen frei und ohne normative Grundlage wählen und festsetzen'. 65. Pangermanism: theories that German 'Kultur' and German 'Blut' were superior, implicating that Germans should rule the world.
